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Abstract 
This paper presents a new argument for the likelihood ratio measure of confirmation by showing 
that one of the adequacy criteria used in another argument (Zalabardo 2009) can be replaced by a 
more plausible and better supported criterion which is a special case of the weak likelihood 
principle. This new argument is also used to show that the likelihood ratio measure is also to be 
preferred not to a measure that has recently received support in the literature.  
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1. Introduction 
Assessing the support that a piece of evidence provides for a given hypothesis is important in 
many different fields, including law and medicine as well as science more generally. A 
probabilistic approach to this topic in terms of measures of confirmation (or evidential support) 
has not only received significant attention in the philosophical literature but has also been studied 
in detail in other disciplines such as cognitive science (see for example Tentori et al. 2007) and 
computer science (see for example Greco et al. 2012). The idea is that a measure, denoted c, of 
the confirmation of hypothesis, H, by evidence, E, should satisfy the following condition: 
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where Pr is a probability distribution. If c(H,E) > 0, E is said to confirm H, whereas if c(H,E) < 
0, E is said to disconfirm H. 
 
Various confirmation measures have been proposed which satisfy the above condition but are 
nevertheless not ordinally equivalent.
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 Some well-known measures include the following: 
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where the distance measure, d, the log-ratio measure, r, the log-likelihood ratio measure, l, in 
particular have had a lot of supporters.
3
 It is worth noting that taking logarithms in (2) and (3) 
has no effect on the orderings provided by these measures, but is just to ensure that they satisfy 
the condition noted above. For simplicity, the ratio and likelihood ratio measures, which do not 
involve logarithms, will be used in the rest of the paper unless otherwise specified  
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Given the number of non-equivalent confirmation measures, it is not surprising that various 
adequacy criteria have been proposed to differentiate between them. In this paper, the focus will 
be on criteria proposed by Zalabardo (2009) in his argument for the likelihood ratio measure. 
Section 2 will present his argument and show that while one of his criteria is unobjectionable and 
follows from a widely accepted criterion, the case for another one of his criteria is much less 
straightforward. An alternative adequacy criterion is proposed in section 3 and it is then shown 
that this provides reason not only to prefer the likelihood ratio measure to those mentioned 
already, but also to another measure that has received support in recent literature. 
 
2. Zalabardo’s argument for the likelihood ratio measure 
In his defence of the likelihood ratio measure of confirmation, José Zalabardo (2009) starts by 
drawing upon an argument due to Schlesinger (1995) in order to reject the difference measure, d.  
Schlesinger asks us to consider two scenarios, which we shall call Original Schlesinger 
Scenarios, one where Pr(H1) = 1/10
9
 and Pr(H1|E1) = 1/100 and another where Pr(H2) = 0.26 
and Pr(H2|E2) = 0.27. He claims, and Zalabardo agrees, that intuitively the degree of 
confirmation should be much greater in the former case than in the latter. This is borne out by the 
ratio measure which gives r(H1,E1) = 10
7
 and r(H2,E2)  ≈ 1.038, but not by the difference 
measure which gives d(H1,E1) = 0.00999… and d(H2,E2)  = 0.01. Note that the likelihood ratio 
measure also handles this example appropriately since l(H,E) can be expressed as [Pr(H | E) ×  
Pr(∼H)] / [Pr(H) × Pr(∼H | E)] and so l(H2,E2) ≈ 1.01 x 10
7
 and l(H2,E2) ≈ 1.053.  
 
Although Schlesinger’s argument does not rule out the likelihood difference measure, ld, 
proposed by Nozick (1981) or the measure s, proposed by Christensen (1999), Zalabardo appeals 
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to the following adequacy criterion: 
 (C1)  If Pr(H | E1)  >  Pr(H | E2), then E1 confirms H to a higher degree than E2 does.
4
 
This is a very plausible criterion and as Fitelson (2007) comments it ‘seems to be accepted by all 
historical practitioners of confirmation theory’. Although this criterion could be discussed 
further, it will be accepted for the purposes of this paper, where the attention will focus on 
Zalabardo’s argument for the likelihood ratio measure, l, rather than the ratio measure, r. 
 
Zalabardo proposes the following adequacy criteria for a measure of confirmation of hypothesis 
H by evidence E: 
 (C2) If Pr(E1 | H) = Pr(E2 ∣ H) and Pr(E1 ∣∼H) < Pr(E2 ∣∼H), then E1 confirms H to a  
  higher degree than E2 does. 
 (C3) If Pr(E1 ∣ H1) = Pr(E2 ∣ H2) and Pr(E1 ∣∼H1) < Pr(E2 ∣∼H2), then E1 confirms  
  H1 to a higher degree than E2 confirms H2. 
Zalabardo uses an example to motivate criterion (C2), but the case can be strengthened further by 
noting that it is a special case of criterion (C1). To see this, note that if Pr(E1 | H) = Pr(E2 | H) 
and Pr(E1 | ∼H) < Pr(E2 | ∼H) then it follows that Pr(E1) < Pr(E2) and hence via Bayes’ theorem 
that Pr(H | E1)  >  Pr(H | E2). Criterion (C2) does not help in the selection of a confirmation 
measure since it is satisfied by all the measures presented in this paper, but Zalabardo uses (C2) 
to motivate (C3) by arguing that the same intuition that sanctions (C2) also sanctions (C3).  
 
Criterion (C3) is much less straightforward, however. The difference between criteria (C2) and 
(C3) is that the former considers different evidence for the same hypothesis, whereas the latter 
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applies the same principle to the case where different evidence is considered for different 
hypotheses. A potential worry might be that the principle will no longer apply since the prior 
probabilities of the hypotheses will in general be different. This gives rise to a potential conflict 
between criterion (C3) and Zalabardo’s use of Schlesinger’s argument. Neither Schlesinger nor 
Zalabardo try to formulate a criterion based on this example, but in the Original Schlesinger 
scenarios the idea seems to be that it is the much larger relative increase in probability that 
warrants the greater degree of confirmation in one case than in the other. Consider now a pair of 
scenarios, which for reasons that will become apparent we will call Modified Schlesinger 
Scenarios. These scenarios have been chosen to be very similar to those Zalabardo uses to show 
that the ratio measure, r, does not satisfy criterion (C3). In the first scenario, let Pr(E1 | H1)  = 
19/20, Pr(E1 | ∼H1) = 1/40 and Pr(H1) = 2/3 and in the second let Pr(E2 | H2)  = 19/20, Pr(E2 | 
∼H2) = 1/30 and Pr(H2) = 1/10. According to criterion (C3), the confirmation should be greater 
in the former case than in the latter and, of course, this is borne out by the likelihood ratio 
measure since l(H1,E1) = 38 and l(H2,E2) = 28.5. By contrast, the ratio measure fails to satisfy 
(C3) since r(H1,E1) ≈ 1.48 and r(H2,E2) = 7.6 since the posterior probabilities are Pr(H1 | E1) 
=76/77 and Pr(H2 | E2) =19/25. However, in conflict with criterion (C3), the intuition underlying 
Schlesinger’s argument suggests that the degree of confirmation should be much greater in the 
latter case since it has a much larger relative increase in probability (an increase from 1/10 to 
19/25 compared to an increase from 2/3 to 76/77 in the former case). 
 
Does this mean that acceptable measures of confirmation should fail to satisfy criterion (C3)? In 
particular, is there a problem with the ordering provided by the likelihood ratio measure, l, in the 
Modified Schlesinger Scenarios? The answer to this seems to be ‘no’. Note that l assigns a high 
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value in the case where the probability of H1 increases from 2/3 to almost 1. More generally, l 
satisfies the following criterion, known as logicality (see Fitelson 2007):  
 (C4)  If E entails H (∼H), the degree of confirmation of H by E should be maximal  
  (minimal).
5
 
This criterion makes sense if confirmation is to be understood as a generalization of logical 
entailment as is appropriate in the context of inductive logic. Equating ‘E entails H’ with Pr(H | 
E) = 1, then it is reasonable that in certain cases, such as the confirmation of H1 by E1 in the 
Modified Schlesinger Scenarios, the degree of confirmation should be high even though the prior 
probability was high to start with. Thus, although Schlesinger’s argument based on the Original 
Schlesinger Scenarios is very plausible, care must be taken if it is to be applied more generally 
and there is no clear reason to think that it can be extended in such a way as to pose a problem 
for the likelihood ratio measure. 
 
Having said that, it is not clear that (C4) should be adopted as an adequacy criterion for 
confirmation measures. While it is suitable if confirmation is to be considered as a generalization 
of entailment, it is not so clear that it must be accepted if confirmation is to be considered in 
terms of the more general notion of evidential support as discussed at the start of this paper, i.e. 
quantifying the extent to which the hypothesis is made more probable by the evidence.
6
 And the 
same point applies to (C3). While it is far from clear that measures satisfying (C3) should be 
rejected, given its tension with Schlesinger’s argument a more convincing reason would need to 
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be provided to adopt it as an adequacy criterion. Instead, however, an alternative criterion will be 
proposed in the following section. 
 
3. A new adequacy criterion for confirmation measures 
Consider the following proposed adequacy criterion:  
 (C5)  If Pr(E | H1) = Pr(E | H2) and Pr(E | ∼H1) < Pr(E | ∼H2), then E confirms H1 to  
  a higher degree than E confirms H2.  
Like criterion (C2) and unlike (C3), this proposal keeps something fixed, in this case the 
evidence, E. Support for (C5) can be obtained by noting that it is a special case of the weak 
likelihood principle which can be stated as follows (see Joyce 2008):  
 (C6)  If Pr(E | H1) ≥ Pr(E | H2) and Pr(E | ∼H1) ≤ Pr(E | ∼H2), with one inequality  
  strict, then E confirms H1 to a higher degree than E confirms H2.
7
  
Joyce argues that this principle ‘must be an integral part of any account of evidential relevance 
that deserves the title “Bayesian”’. Note also that criterion (C5) is a special case of criterion (C3) 
in which E1 and E2 are the same and as such it is a much weaker claim since one can accept 
criterion (C5) while rejecting criterion (C3) but not vice versa. Furthermore, there is no obvious 
tension between criterion (C5) and the Original Schlesinger Scenarios or Modified Schlesinger 
Scenarios. The reason for this is that these scenarios relate to cases where Pr(H1 | E1) / Pr(H1) ≠ 
Pr(H2 | E2) / Pr(H2), which cannot arise if Pr(E  | H1) = Pr(E | H2). For this reason the ratio 
measure fails to satisfy criterion (C5) since r(H1,E1) =  r(H2,E2) if Pr(E | H1) = Pr(E | H2) 
irrespective of the values of Pr(E | ∼H1) and Pr(E | ∼H2). Clearly, the likelihood ratio measure 
satisfies (C5). 
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It is worth noting that criterion (C5) is not as discriminating as criterion (C3) since, apart from 
the ratio measure, (C5) is satisfied by all the other measures considered so far. However, if 
providing a correct ordering for the Original Schlesinger Scenarios and criterion (C1) are both to 
be imposed as requirements for confirmation measures, as Zalabardo proposes, d, s and ld can all 
be ruled out. Since (5) rules out r, this means that l is the only measure satisfying the proposed 
adequacy requirements. 
 
Another confirmation measure, which has not been considered so far, is the certainty factor 
(Shortliﬀe and Buchanan 1975), which has been used in the field of expert systems and has 
recently been advocated as a measure of confirmation (see Crupi et al. 2007 and Crupi and 
Tentori 2013). It is defined as follows: 
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  (6) 
Both l and cf also satisfy symmetry criteria proposed by Eells and Fitelson (2002), while cf also 
satisfies extended symmetry criteria proposed by Crupi et al. (2007) but l does not.
8
 The 
symmetry proposals of Crupi et al. are based on generalizing those of classical logic. For  
example, if E entails H it is not the case in general that H also entails E and so, taking the degree 
of confirmation to be a generalization of entailment, they argue that if E confirms H the degree 
of confirmation of H by E should not necessarily be the same as that of E by H. However, in 
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classical logic, if E refutes H (i.e. E entails ∼H), then H also refutes E and so they argue that if E 
disconfirms H the degree of disconfirmation of H by E should be the same as the degree of 
disconfirmation of E by H.  
 
A proper evaluation of the interesting proposal of Crupi et al. is beyond the scope of this paper, 
but it is worth noting that although l does not satisfy their symmetry principles, it does satisfy 
them in the extreme cases, for example, when E refutes H. This follows from the fact that l 
satisfies (C4). Arguably this is sufficient in terms of symmetry for a confirmation measure to 
generalize entailment in classical logic. At the very least, the failure of l to satisfy the more 
detailed symmetry criteria of Crupi et al. does not seem sufficient to rule it out as a measure of 
confirmation independent of other criteria.  
 
Another factor to take into account when comparing l and cf is the fact that cf does not handle the 
Original Schlesinger Scenarios in a satisfactory way. In the scenario where Pr(H1) = 1/10
9
 and 
Pr(H1 | E1)= 1/100 the certainty factor gives the result cf(H1,E1) = 0.00999… while in the 
scenario where Pr(H2) = 0.26 and Pr(H2 | E2)= 0.27 it gives cf(H2,E2) ≈ 0.0135. As pointed out 
earlier, l does give an intuitively correct result in this case.  
 
Finally, cf does not satisfy criterion (C5) in cases of disconfirmation. To see this, suppose that 
the antecedent of (C5) holds so that Pr(E | H1) = Pr(E | H2) and Pr(E | ∼H1) < Pr(E | ∼H2). Let 
us further suppose that E disconfirms H1, which means that Pr(E | H1) < Pr(E) and hence Pr(E | 
H2) < Pr(E) so that E disconfirms H2 as well. Using Bayes’ theorem to replace the term Pr(H | 
E) in the expression for cf(H,E) in the case of disconfirmation, cf(H,E) can be expressed as 
10 
 
Pr(E|H)/Pr(E) – 1 and so cf(H1,E)= cf(H2,E) which disagrees with criterion (C5). Strangely, 
although cf fails to satisfy (C5) in cases of disconfirmation, it does satisfy it in cases of 
confirmation. Hence, according to cf, whether the difference between Pr(E | ∼H1) and  Pr(E | 
∼H2) results in a difference in degree of confirmation in cases where Pr(E | H1) = Pr(E | H2) 
depends on whether confirmation or disconfirmation occurs.
9
 
 
Overall, these findings give us reason to prefer the likelihood ratio measure, l, to the certainty 
factor, cf, as well as to the other measures presented earlier in the paper. While cf does satisfy 
some symmetry properties not satisfied by l, it is far from clear that this constitutes a serious 
problem for l. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has provided a new defence of the likelihood ratio measure based on criteria (C1) and 
(C5) and an argument due to Schlesinger. This is a development of an earlier argument due to 
Zalabardo (2009). In particular, it has been argued that one of Zalabardo’s adequacy criteria (C3) 
can be replaced by a logically weaker and better supported criterion (C5). It has also been argued 
that these same criteria give us reasons to prefer the likelihood ratio measure not only to a 
number of measures that have received a lot of attention in the philosophical literature but also to 
the certainty factor measure which has been advocated recently.  
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